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NOT ALL WHO WANDER SHOULD BE LOST1:  
THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS BEDOUINS IN 
THE MODERN STATE OF ISRAEL 
INTRODUCTION 
he past two centuries can perhaps best be described as the age of 
nationalism. Colonialism, the touchstone of the late eighteenth 
through the early twentieth centuries, began to wane, and indigenous 
peoples all across the globe began to take responsibility for the determi-
nation of their own social and political futures.2 Among the weakest, 
poorest, and least-represented members of developing societies, indigen-
ous peoples are often disregarded, at best, and discriminated against, at 
worst, within the legal and social frameworks of the countries in which 
they reside.3 In order to remedy past inequities, it is therefore necessary 
to explore the various mechanisms of international law as they relate to 
both indigenous peoples of the world and the governments that are their 
de facto rulers. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the modern State 
of Israel’s relations with its Bedouin Arab inhabitants.4 
Since its inception in 1948, Israel has dealt with the issues of the Be-
douin minority within its borders in various ways, ranging from the dis-
criminatory5 to the seemingly beneficial.6 This Note argues that Israel, as 
a democracy and as a signatory to various international treaties and con-
ventions on human rights,7 has an affirmative duty to redress past inequi-
ties in the treatment of its Bedouin population as well as an incumbent 
responsibility to safeguard the rights of all its citizens. Part I of this Note 
describes the factual and legal history of the treatment of Bedouin Arabs 
in the State of Israel. Part II looks at the domestic legal framework within 
                                                                                                             
 1. Apologies to J.R.R. Tolkien for the bastardization of the passage, “All that is gold 
does not glitter, not all those who wander are lost.” J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE FELLOWSHIP OF 
THE RING 168 (Houghton Mifflin 2002) (1954). 
 2. See generally S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2004). 
 3. Id. 
 4. For a general overview of the history of Bedouin Arab minorities in Israel, see 
PENNY MADRELL, THE BEDUIN OF THE NEGEV (1990). 
 5. For a general discussion of Israel’s discriminatory policies towards its Bedouin 
citizens, specifically in the sphere of housing rights, see Tawfiq Rangwala, Inadequate 
Housing, Israel and the Bedouin of the Negev, 42 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 415 (2004). 
 6. For discussion of a recent Israeli Supreme Court decision mandating the imple-
mentation of affirmative action in the assignment of counselors for Bedouin schools to 
remedy high dropout rates, see Adalah, Newsletter Vol. 9 (Jan. 2005), http://www.adalah. 
org/newsletter/eng/jan05/1.php. 
 7. See infra notes 88–89. 
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which Israeli conduct towards the Bedouin minority can be judged. Part 
III examines the international legal obligations Israel has to its citizens 
and discusses various sources of law that shed light on the responsibili-
ties Israel must fulfill. Part IV surveys the obligations owed to the 
“stranger” in what can arguably be called one of the earliest systems of 
“international law”—Jewish law—and explores how these obligations 
instruct the conduct of the Jewish State. Finally, Part V looks at the cur-
rent situation of Bedouins in Israel and the impact of recent legal devel-
opments. Ultimately, this Note calls for Israeli leaders and academics to 
unequivocally support proactive changes in how Israeli law and society 
treat Bedouin Arabs as a precursor and prerequisite to any lasting peace 
between Israel and its Arab neighbors. 
I. NOMADS NO MORE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF BEDOUIN ARABS IN ISRAEL 
The term “Bedouin” has varied meanings8 and connotations.9 The ter-
minology used to describe Israel’s Arab citizens is in itself “highly poli-
ticized”10 and infuses the legal inquiry with biases and preconceptions. 
Regardless of the connotations, it is clear that the Bedouins in present-
                                                                                                             
 8. Long utilized as a synonym for the term “Arab” in what is now known as the 
Middle East, the name “Bedouin” comes from the Arabic badawiyin, meaning people 
who hail from open areas such as the desert. “Bedouin” often has the further connotation 
of a “raider.” All of the nomadic tribes in the region were “Arabs” (“wanderers”), but 
some received the additional classification of “raiders.” THOMAS KIERNAN, THE ARABS 
70 (1975). 
 9. See MADRELL, supra note 4, at 20 (“To Europeans the word ‘beduin’ evokes a 
strong and generally positive image. . . . [B]eduin are less romantic in Israeli eyes than in 
British. Where Englishmen see noble simplicity and the exhilaration of desert horizons, 
the Israeli thinks of smuggled hashish, trachoma and illiterate children.”). 
 10. Zama Coursen-Neff, Discrimination Against Palestinian Arab Children in the 
Israeli Educational System, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L. L. & POL. 749, 749–50 n.2 (2003) (choos-
ing not to use the term Bedouin, instead calling them “Palestinian Arabs,” which the au-
thor concedes is not necessarily used by the Bedouins in describing themselves). For the 
purposes of this Note, when “Bedouin Israelis” or “Bedouins” are mentioned, the terms 
refer particularly to the Negev (Southern Israeli) Bedouin as opposed to their Northern 
Israeli counterparts. Having similar customs in general, the two are distinguishable most 
notably due to the fact that Bedouin of the Negev are much less integrated into Israeli 
society, in part due to their remote location in the Negev desert. See MADRELL, supra 
note 4, at 4. 
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day Israel are still considered the “nomadic other”11 both within Israeli 
society and by many of their fellow Arabs.12 
From their beginnings, the Bedouins were nomadic, desert-dwelling 
tribesmen who made a living as shepherds of camels and sheep.13 When 
the United Nations partitioned British Palestine in 1947,14 approximately 
90,000 Bedouins15 were already living in the area that was to ultimately 
become modern-day Israel.16 As opposed to other Bedouin tribes in Mid-
dle Eastern and North African countries, Israeli Bedouin are an ethnic 
minority “with a distinct character and unique customs.”17 One logical 
side effect of the continued growth of the State of Israel in the 1950s was 
the need for more land for the agricultural development of the nascent 
Jewish State and the settlement of its people.18 This need was often ful-
filled through executive policies19 of land expropriation20 designed to 
                                                                                                             
 11. Ronen Shamir, Suspended in Space: Bedouins Under the Law of Israel, 30 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 231, 232 n.2 (1996). 
 12. MADRELL, supra note 4, at 3 (“[The Bedouin] are looked down upon by Jewish 
Israelis and other Palestinians alike as primitive . . . . The Bedouin of the Negev are truly 
a minority twice over.”). 
 13. ISSACHAR ROSEN-ZVI, TAKING SPACE SERIOUSLY: LAW, SPACE AND SOCIETY IN 
CONTEMPORARY ISRAEL 75 (2004). 
 14. G.A. Res. 181 (II), at 131, U.N. Doc. A/519 (Nov. 29, 1947). 
 15. Although population statistics from that era are speculative at best, the number of 
Bedouins in the partitioned territory under Israeli control was estimated in a report to the 
General Assembly on September 3, 1947. U.N. Special Comm. on Palestine [UNSCOP], 
Report to the General Assembly, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., Supp. No. 11, at 102, U.N. Doc. 
A/364 (Sept. 3, 1947). 
 16. Madrell posits that, prior to the 1947 partition, there were anywhere from 65,000 
to 95,000 Bedouin in the Negev, with that number falling to fewer than 13,000 by 1951. 
MADRELL, supra note 4, at 6. 
 17. ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 13, at 76. 
 18. See Rangwala, supra note 5, at 438 (“The Negev represents a great mass of land 
available for future settlement and is prized for that reason above all others.”). See also 
MADRELL, supra note 4, at 7 (discussing the harsh rule under military government, prob-
ably due to the fact that “Israeli authorities were especially anxious to populate the Negev 
with Jews”). 
 19. See Shamir, supra note 11, at 236 (discussing the Israeli government policies that 
emphasized the Negev as empty and the Bedouin nomads as “part of nature,” resulting in 
the official narratives that the Negev is “an empty space that awaits Jewish liberation” 
and the Bedouins are a “nomadic culture that awaits civilization”). 
 20. For a general discussion on this issue, see HUSSEIN ABU HUSSEIN & FIONA 
MCKAY, ACCESS DENIED: PALESTINIAN LAND RIGHTS IN ISRAEL (2003); George E. Bisha-
rat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 
467 (1993); Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, The Legal Transformation of Ethnic Geography: 
Israeli Law and the Palestinian Landholder 1948–1967, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 923 
(2001). 
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urge the Bedouins into urban settlements,21 effectively altering the very 
bases of their economy22 and leaving them ostensibly dependent on the 
administrative state for subsistence.23 Approximately 87% of the land 
expropriated,24 and thereafter regarded as state owned, was located in the 
Negev desert25 where Bedouins are still largely concentrated.26 
Over the first few decades of its existence, as Israel developed into a 
modern industrialized nation, the institutional discrimination27 against 
Israeli Arabs, and in particular Bedouins, continued virtually unabated in 
areas ranging from education,28 health care,29 water,30 and land rights31 to 
                                                                                                             
 21. See Shamir, supra note 11, at 231. Shamir quotes the Minister of Agriculture, 
Moshe Dayan, as saying, “We should transform the Bedouins into an urban proletariat. . . . 
Without coercion but with government direction . . . this phenomenon of the Bedouins 
will disappear.” Id. 
 22. For a discussion of the changing socioeconomic conditions of the Bedouins in the 
developing State of Israel, see AVINOAM MEIR, AS NOMADISM ENDS: THE ISRAELI 
BEDOUIN OF THE NEGEV 18 (1998). See also MADRELL, supra note 4, at 20 (discussing the 
remarkable change in the sources of livelihood for Arab Bedouins in Israel “from an al-
most entirely agricultural and pastoral community” in the 1940s and 1950s to “one over-
whelmingly dependent on mainly unskilled wage labour” in the 1980s and beyond). 
 23. ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 13, at 55. 
 24. “By 1959 the State had expropriated 250,000 dunams [approximately 63,000 
acres] from Bedouin Arabs in the Negev.” MADRELL, supra note 4, at 8. 
 25. HUSSEIN & MCKAY, supra note 20, at 39 (using the term “Naqab” desert, which is 
the Arabic word for “Negev”). 
 26. See MADRELL, supra note 4, at 3. 
 27. See DAVID KRETZMER, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARABS IN ISRAEL 117 (1990) 
(discussing three interconnected modes of institutional discrimination often practiced 
under the guise of discretionary administrative power: budgetary discrimination, resource 
allocation, and implementation of laws). 
 28. “Schools in the government-planned settlements for beduin . . . still lag far behind 
the standard of Jewish-Israeli education and have smaller budgets.” MADRELL, supra note 
4 at 16. 
 29. See id. at 17 (citing an independent Israeli survey conducted in 1983 that con-
cluded the Negev Bedouin receive medical care “below the minimum standard to which 
every citizen is entitled”). See also Rangwala, supra note 5, at 422–23 (discussing higher 
infant mortality rates among Bedouin and positing that “both the accessibility of health 
care services and the quality of care available to Bedouin living in both the townships and 
unrecognized villages remains grossly inadequate”). 
 30. See MADRELL, supra note 4, at 12–13 (“Except the few who got some irrigated 
land as compensation after 1980, beduin farmers do not get water allocations.”). 
 31. See Kedar, supra note 20, at 924 (discussing the Israeli legal system, “which by 
transforming land possession rules in ways that undermined the possibilities of Arab 
landholders to maintain their possession, brought about the transference and registration 
of ownership of this land to the Jewish State”). See also MADRELL, supra note 4, at 12 
(“The Jewish settlements can lease land for up to [forty-nine] years . . . . Each year [the 
Bedouin farmers] must reapply and are likely to receive different lands or even no lands 
at all.”). 
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herding and grazing rights.32 The Bedouin tribes were pressured to reset-
tle within a military enclosure area33 in townships34 separated from Jew-
ish Israeli settlements and cities, but still close enough for Bedouins to 
work in the areas from which they were residentially segregated.35 The 
rest of the Negev Bedouin population (i.e., those who did not move to the 
government townships) lived in numerous villages unrecognized by the 
State.36 These unrecognized villages provide even starker examples of 
Israel’s disparate treatment of its Bedouin citizens, as “[t]he villages are 
characterized by a lack of basic services, such as running water, electrici-
ty, telephone lines, paved roads, schools, and other public institutions.”37 
Furthermore, since it is impossible for Bedouins in these villages to ob-
tain building permits, many Bedouins continue to be indicted every year 
for “illegal” construction activity, and the Israeli government has slated 
innumerable houses for demolition.38 These legal obstacles cast the Be-
douin as interlopers in their own homes.39 Additionally, in order to put a 
positive legal veneer on its policy of land acquisition, the Israeli legisla-
ture passed a series of laws that, in both practice and effect, serve to legi-
timize the resettlement of the Negev Bedouin population.40 
This policy of state-sponsored sedentarization has resulted in modern-
day Bedouins becoming “the most socially, politically and economically 
disadvantaged segment of the [Arab] Minority in Israel.”41 In crafting a 
                                                                                                             
 32. See id. at 13. See also Rangwala, supra note 5, at 442–43 (discussing the Plant 
Protection Law of 1950 that required “Bedouin shepherds to get a permit from the minis-
try of agriculture to graze their goats” on certain lands and noting the consequential 
dwindling of Bedouin flocks). 
 33. The enclosure area consisted of roughly ten percent of the land that was previous-
ly inhabited exclusively by the Bedouin community. Rangwala, supra note 5, at 420. 
 34. Ar’ara, Houra, Kuseifa, Laqiah, Rahat, Segev-Shalom, and Tel-Sheva. ROSEN-
ZVI, supra note 13, at 46. 
 35. Id. 
 36. For a general discussion of these so-called “unrecognized villages,” see HUSSEIN 
& MCKAY, supra note 20, at 255–81. 
 37. Rangwala, supra note 5, at 421. 
 38. See Shamir, supra note 11, at 246–47. 
 39. See Rangwala, supra note 5, at 435. 
 40. Two laws in particular enabled the Israeli government to redefine the nature of 
property ownership in the area and utilize land newly defined as “abandoned” for predo-
minantly Jewish settlement interests. Land Acquisition (Validation of Acts & Compensa-
tion) Law, 5713-1953, 7 LSI 43 (1952–1953) (Isr.); Absentees’ Property Law, 5710-1950, 
4 LSI 68 (1949–1950) (Isr.). For an in-depth discussion of the Absentees’ Property Law 
and its repercussions on Israel’s Arab population in general, see Bisharat, supra note 20, 
at 512–14. For a more detailed look at both of these laws, as well as others on point, and 
their effects on the Bedouin population of the Negev in particular, see Rangwala, supra 
note 5, at 439–49. 
 41. Rangwala, supra note 5, at 416–17. 
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possible future solution to this past and present-day inequity, it is impera-
tive, therefore, to survey domestic Israeli legislation that has enabled this 
unfairness to occur in the past as well as Israel’s international legal 
commitments that should prevent it from continuing in the future. 
II. SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: DOMESTIC ISRAELI LEGAL SOURCES FOR 
BEDOUIN RIGHTS 
In order to elucidate the responsibilities Israel has to its citizens, one 
must first have a basic understanding of the complex structure of Israeli 
law. Israel has no written constitution, so the domestic rights granted its 
citizens must be gleaned from other sources, specifically the Declaration 
of the Establishment of the State of Israel and the Law of Return, the 
judicial case law of the Israeli Supreme Court, and the Basic Laws 
promulgated by the Knesset, Israel’s parliament. 
A. The Declaration and the Law of Return 
The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel provides: 
“The State of Israel . . . will be based on freedom, justice and peace . . . 
[and] it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all 
its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex.”42 At first glance, it 
seems rather clear that the drafters of the Declaration intended complete 
equality to mean just that. Soon after the creation of the State, however, 
the Knesset passed a law that seemingly contradicts this idea of complete 
equality. In 1950, the Knesset promulgated the Law of Return, which 
gives every Jew born in or immigrating to Israel the right to Israeli citi-
zenship.43 This law was not merely a public relations campaign for Jew-
ish immigration in the 1950s. It was, and remains to this day, the legisla-
tive embodiment of the very idea of a Jewish State, acknowledging the 
most basic principle of Zionist ideology44—the inextricable link between 
the Jewish Diaspora and the Jewish State.45 Still, this raises questions of 
how this law, which clearly grants preferential treatment to Jews as op-
                                                                                                             
 42. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 3, (1948) 
(Isr.) [hereinafter Declaration]. 
 43. Law of Return, 1950, 51 S.H.159. (“Every Jew has the right to come to this coun-
try as an oleh [Jewish immigrant to Israel].”). 
 44. Zionism is a modern political ideology that developed in Europe in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. The main ethos of Zionism is the founding and cultivation of a 
Jewish State in biblical Canaan to serve as a homeland for the Jewish populations of all 
nations. For a detailed discussion of the rise of Zionism and its most basic principles, see 
WALTER LAQUEUR, A HISTORY OF ZIONISM (1976). 
 45. KRETZMER, supra note 27, at 18. The term “Diaspora” refers to those Jews who 
live outside of the land of Israel. 
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posed to citizens of any other religion, can coexist with the principle of 
complete equality that the Declaration mentions.  
While equality is clearly an important principle at the heart of Israeli 
law, it is not without limitation.46 First, the term itself is hard to define, 
as it signifies a dynamic idea that depends on unique factors in a given 
society. As societal values and attitudes change, so too must the concep-
tion of what equality entails.47 Second, like any principle of Israeli con-
stitutional law,48 equality is “subordinate to the supremacy of [Knesset] 
legislation.”49 Hence, if a conflict arises between the principle of equality 
from the Declaration and the plain meaning of a Knesset statute, the sta-
tute is dispositive.50 
B. Judicial Law 
The Israeli judiciary has identified equality as an important, albeit un-
written, constitutional principle.51 Additionally, the Israeli Supreme 
Court reasoned that the principle of equality should be given special sta-
tus due to the unique historical experience of the Jewish people: 
When we were exiled from our country and removed from our land we 
became victims of the nations of the world among whom we lived, and 
                                                                                                             
 46. See HUSSEIN & MCKAY, supra note 20, at 281 (discussing the weak status of 
equality in Israeli law in regard to competing policy considerations). See also KRETZMER, 
supra note 27, at 11 (discussing the principle of equality in Israeli law as a “soft legal 
principle” that cannot overcome “contrary provisions in primary legislation”). 
 47. As an anecdotal example from American history, although equality is an integral 
concept in both the Declaration of Independence and the U.S. Constitution, it took almost 
200 years for that equality to be implemented for African Americans. 
 48. The term “constitutional law” is purposefully not capitalized here and throughout 
this Note, as it does not relate to laws of a particular constitution, rather the body of laws 
that constitute the general legal apparatus of the State of Israel. 
 49. KRETZMER, supra note 27, at 77. 
 50. Id. at 8. (citing HCJ 10/48 Zeev v. Gubernik, [1948] IsrSC 85(1) 89 (holding that 
the Declaration is not a “Constitutional law which determines the validity or invalidity of 
ordinances and statutes”). 
 51. See HUSSEIN & MCKAY, supra note 20, at 281 (citing HC 953/87 Poraz v. Mayor 
of Tel Aviv, [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 309. The High Court held that public authorities must 
give “reasonable weight” to the principle of equality and seek to find alternative ways, 
congruent with the principle of equality, to achieve the ends of the particular policy 
sought. The court reasoned further that the test for whether a public authority had in fact 
acted in a discriminatory fashion was comprised of three elements: (1) the authority must 
present evidence that it considered the infringement upon the principle of equality; (2) the 
authority must show that it evaluated the competing considerations and gave “reasonable 
weight” to equality; and (3) after balancing the competing considerations, the authority 
had come to the conclusion that there was no other way to effect the particular policy 
choice. Id. 
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throughout the generations we tasted the bitterness of persecution, op-
pression and discrimination merely because we were Jews. . . . Given 
this sorrowful experience, which deeply affected our national and hu-
man consciousness, it is to be expected that we will not adopt these ab-
errant ways of the nations of the world, and now that our independence 
has been renewed in the State of Israel we must be careful to prevent 
any hint of discrimination towards any law-abiding non-Jew among us 
who wishes to live with us in his own way, according to his religion 
and belief. . . . We must exhibit a human and tolerant attitude . . . and 
maintain the great rule of equality in rights and obligations between all 
persons.52 
The court draws a direct connection between the historical sufferings of 
the Jewish people and an affirmative duty to treat all inhabitants of the 
modern State of Israel with the humanity and dignity that the founders of 
the State sought for themselves.53 Accordingly, the Israeli Supreme Court 
has asserted that “discrimination on grounds of religion or race will be 
regarded as improper use of administrative discretion, even if that discre-
tion is absolute,”54 and that the construction of statutory language must 
further the principle of equality under the law.55 
In the spring of 2000, the Israeli Supreme Court decided a case called 
Qa’adan v. Israeli Lands Administration, where it held that the State is 
forbidden from utilizing national institutions to carry out actions on its 
behalf that have discriminatory purpose or effect.56 In this case, a Be-
douin family challenged the administration’s refusal to allow them to 
purchase a home in Katzir on the grounds that Katzir only accepted Jew-
ish residents.57 The court found that state discrimination based on natio-
nality, overt or otherwise, was illegal and that the State could not cir-
cumvent this prohibition by delegating land allocation authority to insti-
tutions that then allocate the land in a discriminatory fashion.58 That 
same year, in a landmark decision on equality rights vis-á-vis Israeli 
Arab minorities, the court clearly stated that “[t]he resources of the State 
. . . belong to all citizens and all citizens are entitled to enjoy them ac-
                                                                                                             
 52. KRETZMER, supra note 27, at 9. (citing CA 56/71 Emma Berger v. Dist. Planning 
Comm. [1972] IsrSC 27(2) 764, 771). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (citing CA 16/61 Registrar of Companies v. Kardosh [1961] IsrSC 16(1) 1209, 
1224). 
 55. See id. (citing HC 707/81 Abu-Hatzeira v. Attorney Gen. [1981] IsrSC 35(4) 
561). 
 56. Rangwala, supra note 5, at 427 (citing HCJ 6698/95 Qa’adan v. Israeli Lands 
Admin. [2000] IsrSC 54 (1) 258). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
2008] NOT ALL WHO WANDER 193 
cording to the principle of equality, without discrimination, based on re-
ligion, race, sex or other prohibited consideration.”59 
C. Basic Laws 
Instead of delineating certain fundamental rights and liberties in a con-
stitution, the founders of Israel decided to empower the Knesset to enact 
a series of “Basic Laws”60 that would form, along with regular substan-
tive Knesset legislation and decisions of the judicial courts, the founda-
tion and backbone of modern Israeli law.61 In 1992, paralleling the rea-
soning of its judicial counterparts, the Knesset passed two Basic Laws 
that signified a “first step towards entrenching certain fundamental rights 
and freedoms in Israel.”62 Prior to the promulgation of these Basic Laws, 
the Israeli High Court of Justice did recognize certain rights as funda-
mental.63 The court also ruled that the Basic Laws have constitutional 
significance giving greater force to their various provisions.64 The prac-
tical significance of this ruling, in light of the lack of a single constitu-
tional document guaranteeing fundamental rights, is that the Basic Laws 
                                                                                                             
 59. Id. at 427 n.69 (citing HCJ 1113/99 Adalah v. Minister of Religious Affairs 
[2000] IsrSC 54(2) 164, 165). Adalah, the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in 
Israel, challenged the legality of two budget provisions that allocated funding exclusively 
for Jewish cemeteries. Ruling in favor of the petitioners, the court specifically noted the 
Ministry’s failure to point to any reasonable justification for the budget discrepancy. For 
more information on this case in particular, as well as other cases on point, see Adalah, 
http://www.adalah.org/eng/legaladvocacyreligious.php (last visited Oct. 28, 2007). 
 60. Eleven Basic Laws have been enacted since 1948, mostly dealing with the institu-
tional and administrative workings of the State. Basic Law: The State Comptroller, 1998, 
S.H. 30; Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 5740-1980, 34 LSI 209 (1980) (Isr.); 
Basic Law: The Army, 5736-1976, 30 LSI 150 (1976) (Isr.); Basic Law: The State Econ-
omy, 5735-1975, 29 LSI 273 (1975) (Isr.); Basic Law: Israel Lands, 5720-1960, 14 LSI 
48 (1960) (Isr.); Basic Law: The Judiciary, 5744-1984, 38 LSI 101 (1984) (Isr.); Basic 
Law: The Government, 2001, S.H. 158; Basic Law: President of the State, 5724-1964, 18 
LSI 11 (1964) (Isr.); Basic Law: The Knesset, 5718-1958, 12 LSI 85 (1958) (Isr.); Basic 
Law: Freedom of Occupation, 1992, S.H. 114; Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 
1992, S.H. 150. 
 61. For a general discussion on the makeup of Israeli law, see KRETZMER, supra note 
27. 
 62. HUSSEIN & MCKAY, supra note 20, at 23. 
 63. See Aeyal M. Gross, The Politics of Rights in Israeli Constitutional Law, 3 ISRAEL 
STUD. II 80, 83–84 (1998) (including the examples of freedom of speech, and more im-
portantly for this discussion, equality). 
 64. CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank, Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Village [1993] IsrSC 
49(4) 221. 
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have become the bedrock of civil and human rights in the modern Israeli 
legal structure.65 
The tension between the Law of Return—“the sole Israeli Law that ex-
plicitly discriminates on the basis of ethnicity or national origin”66—and 
the guarantees of equality in the Declaration and Basic Laws is evident.67 
Civil liberties and civil rights, though perhaps not as ingrained and pro-
tected as in the American system, do play an important role in the Israeli 
legal structure.68 Still, the existential conundrum persists: when the con-
tinued Jewish nature of the State is in direct conflict with principles of 
equality, what is the outcome? This tension was illustrated vividly in a 
case dealing with election candidates whose platform included advocat-
ing for the destruction of the State of Israel and denial of its sovereign-
ty.69 The Israeli Supreme Court ruled that, short of clear legislative action 
to the contrary, it could not bar them from running for office, with one 
justice adding in dicta that the Jewish character of the State is a “funda-
mental constitutional fact.”70 The Knesset responded by amending the 
Basic Law: the Knesset precluded from being considered eligible for 
elections candidates who tried to negate “the existence of the State of 
                                                                                                             
 65. HUSSEIN & MCKAY, supra note 20, at 146 (discussing the Basic Laws, in compar-
ison to other streams of Israeli law, as “the most entrenched kind possible in the Israeli 
constitutional system”). 
 66. Bisharat, supra note 20, at 509 n.209. 
 67. See Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultur-
al Rights: Israel, 16, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1/Add.90 (May 23, 2003) (“The Committee reite-
rates its concern that the excessive emphasis upon the State as a ‘Jewish State’ encourag-
es discrimination and accords a second-class status to its non-Jewish citizens.”). See also 
ROSEN-ZVI, supra note 13, at 2 (discussing an offshoot of the Law of Return that prohi-
bits the State from extraditing Jewish citizens, ostensibly “collapsing the distinction be-
tween the notions of citizenship and ethnicity”). 
 68. KRETZMER, supra note 27, at 8 (discussing a line of Israeli Supreme Court cases 
that held that basic civil rights, though largely not codified, exist as legal principles in 
Israeli jurisprudence). This is further evidenced by the fact that the Constitution, Law and 
Justice Committee of the Knesset has been working for years on drafting Israel’s written 
constitution and plans to include such rights in the eventual draft: “[t]he proposed consti-
tution will reiterate the state’s commitment to equal rights for all, including minorities. 
The constitution will emphasize universal human rights, and forbid state discrimination 
among its citizens on the basis of race, religion, or ethnicity.” Knesset Committee De-
bates on the Constitution for Israel, http://www.cfisrael.org//a134.html?rsID=89 (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2007). 
 69. Id. at 24 (citing EA 1/65 Yardor v. Cent. Elections Comm. for the Sixth Knesset 
[1965] 19(3) 365. 
 70. Id. at 24–25. 
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Israel as the State of the Jewish people”71 or those who wished to incite 
racism.72 
Although Israel’s legal system is formally committed to equality, the 
historical encroachments upon equality “reflect the ambiguity in the no-
tion of Israeli nationhood”73 and cast existential uncertainty on the true 
nature of Israel’s identity. On the one hand, Israel is a democratic State 
belonging equally to all of its citizens, regardless of religion, race, or 
sex.74 On the other hand—as the eponymous ancestor of the Jews—Israel 
the people may lay claim to Israel the State as theirs and theirs alone.75 
The coexistence of these two conceptions of statehood is of particular 
significance to Bedouin Israelis76 as full-fledged citizens of a state that 
technically belongs to someone else.77 
In 1992, the Knesset promulgated the Basic Law: Human Dignity and 
Liberty, which guarantees rights to dignity, life, freedom, privacy, and 
property.78 Interestingly, missing from this Basic Law is any mention of 
equality.79 This was remedied, in part, two years later when the Knesset 
amended it to include “fundamental human rights . . . in the spirit of the 
                                                                                                             
 71. See Amendment No. 9 to section 7A of the Basic Law: The Knesset, 1985, S.H. 
196, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic2_eng.htm. 
 72. This part of the Amendment was utilized to preclude controversial Rabbi Meir 
Kahane, known in Israel and the United States for his anti-Arab and racist viewpoints, 
from running for Knesset elections. For a more detailed discussion of the case and its 
ramifications, see KRETZMER, supra note 27, at 26–31. 
 73. Id. at 176. 
 74. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 5708-1948, 1 LSI 3, (1948) 
(Isr.) 
 75. See Rangwala, supra note 5, at 425–26 (The language of the Declaration itself 
“defines the national character of the state as privileging one group, namely the Jewish 
people. . . . Thus[,] as quickly as the principle of equality became an element of the Israe-
li state via its founding Declaration, it simultaneously became neutralized by its Jewish 
characterization.”). 
 76. See id. at 430 (referring to the “system of unequal citizenship” experienced by the 
Negev Bedouin). 
 77. See MADRELL, supra note 4, at 21 (“Many in the beduin community feel this an-
guish . . . and the consequent sense that as a community they are fully acceptable neither 
to the nation they feel part of nor to the state they are citizens of.”). 
 78. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 150, available at http:// 
www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm. 
 79. For a discussion on the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty and its shortcom-
ings in granting complete equality, and even more interestingly, its usage in opposition to 
its stated purpose, see HUSSEIN & MCKAY, supra note 20, at 23–24 (discussing Section 8 
of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, which allows certain laws that may be 
facially discriminatory if they serve a “proper purpose” and “will be used to legitimize 
laws that discriminate in favour of Jews,” preserving the character of Israel as a Jewish 
State even at the expense of fundamental civil rights). 
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principles set forth in the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of 
Israel.”80 Although the inclusion of equality in Israel’s Basic Law: Hu-
man Dignity and Liberty is, at best, indirect, it “is no substitute for a di-
rect provision, and the question must be asked why this principle [of 
equality], which the Israeli high Court has said on a number of occasions 
is a fundamental principle of Israeli law, was omitted.”81 The unans-
wered question of Israel’s domestic legal commitment to true equality 
among its citizens leads one to look to other sources of substantive law, 
specifically international law, to see whether Israel has more concrete 
obligations to its Bedouin citizens. 
III. GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES, LOCAL RESPONSIBILITY: ISRAEL’S 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS 
International law often provides a much sturdier basis than domestic 
law for protecting the rights of indigenous peoples.82 In its infancy in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, international law was understood 
predominantly as a device for governing relations between nation 
states.83 The role of individuals,84 unless acting as state representatives, 
was relatively nonexistent under this rudimentary conception of interna-
tional law.85 Perhaps the seminal moment in the development of modern 
international law came in the aftermath of World War II with the estab-
lishment of the United Nations.86 The statute of the International Court of 
Justice, which the Member States adopted along with the U.N. Charter 
(“Charter”), discusses in the notes the sources of international law: treaty, 
                                                                                                             
 80. Amendment to Section 1 of the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1994 
S.H. 90, available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2007). 
 81. HUSSEIN & MCKAY, supra note 20, at 25. 
 82. Id. at 33. 
 83. See ANAYA, supra note 2, at vii (discussing international law specifically in regard 
to human rights, “which has moved international law away from an exclusively state-
centered orientation”). 
 84. See Eric S. Kobrick, The Ex Post Facto Prohibition and the Exercise of Universal 
Jurisdiction over International Crimes, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 1520–21 (1987) (citing 
Hill, International Affairs: The Individual in International Organization, 28 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 276 (1934) (describing the shift from state-centered international law and the 
emergence of the view that individuals are subject to international law)). 
 85. See Marek St. Korowicz, The Problem of the International Personality of Individ-
uals, 50 AM. J. INT’L L. 533, 537–39 (1956) (examining the shift toward recognition of 
international personality of individuals, particularly in their claims of individual rights). 
 86. See generally ANAYA, supra note 2 (discussing the development of international 
law through the lens of indigenous rights and the United Nations). 
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custom, and general principles.87 Applied to Israel, each of these interna-
tional law sources sheds light on the obligations Israel has to its Bedouin 
minority, and together they instruct how Israel must act more fairly to-
wards them in the future. 
As a member of the United Nations, Israel has bound itself to numer-
ous international treaties, including the Charter as well as the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)88 and the Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”).89 
The protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms is one of the 
main reasons behind the conception of the United Nations in the after-
math of World War II, as evidenced by Article 1 of the Charter, which, 
inter alia, states that the purposes of the United Nations are 
[t]o develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take 
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace; [t]o achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems of an eco-
nomic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for 
all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.90 
Moreover, in Article 55, the Charter reiterates that one of its primary 
functions is the promotion of “universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to 
                                                                                                             
 87. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 
33 U.N.T.S. 993. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States 
provides a more concise definition of international law:  
(1) A rule of international law is one that has been accepted as such by the in-
ternational community of states (a) in the form of customary law; (b) by inter-
national agreement; or (c) by derivation from general principles common to the 
major legal systems of the world. (2) Customary international law results from 
a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of le-
gal obligation. (3) International agreements create law for the states parties the-
reto and may lead to the creation of customary international law when such 
agreements are intended for adherence by states generally and are in fact wide-
ly accepted. (4) General principles common to the major legal systems, even if 
not incorporated or reflected in customary law or international agreement, may 
be invoked as supplementary rules of international law where appropriate. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §102 (1987). 
 88. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171. 
 89. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 90. U.N. Charter art. 1, paras. 2–3. 
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race, sex, language, or religion.”91 This function is imputed to the Mem-
ber States in that “[a]ll Members pledge themselves to take joint and sep-
arate action . . . for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 
55.”92 
Israel ratified the ICCPR and ICESCR on October 3, 1991.93 The 
ICCPR94 includes numerous provisions that hold direct relevance to 
Israel’s continued mistreatment of its Bedouin minority: 
In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.95 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdic-
tion the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
Where not already provided for by existing legislative or other meas-
ures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the 
necessary steps, in accordance with its constitutional processes and 
with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt such laws or other 
measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in 
the present Covenant.96 
Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that terri-
tory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his 
residence.97 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any dis-
crimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law 
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and 
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status.98 
                                                                                                             
 91. Id. art. 55(c). 
 92. Id. art. 56. 
 93. See Office for the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Ratification Page 
for the ICCPR, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/4.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 
2007); Ratification Page for the ICESCR, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/ 
3.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2007). 
 94. For a detailed discussion of the ICCPR, see MELISSA CASTAN, SARAH JOSEPH & 
JENNY SCHULTZ, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: 
CASES, MATERIALS AND COMMENTARY (2004). 
 95. ICCPR, supra note 88, art. 1(2). 
 96. Id. art. 2(2)–(3). 
 97. Id. art. 12(1). 
 98. Id. art. 26. 
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Within this broad framework it is absolutely clear that Israel’s policy of 
resettlement for the Bedouin of the Negev after 1948 and its continued 
governmental actions99 in perpetuating this initial policy violate the prin-
ciples set forth in the ICCPR.100 While it could be argued that Israeli Su-
preme Court decisions, discussed supra, fulfill the obligation to “take the 
necessary steps . . . to adopt such laws . . . as may be necessary to give 
effect to the rights recognized”101 within the ICCPR, it is evident that the 
effects of past discriminatory policies still weigh heavily on the civil102 
and political rights103 of the Bedouin Arab minority and, therefore, much 
more needs to be done in order for Israel to fulfill its obligations under 
the ICCPR. 
The ICESCR also provides rights that elucidate the international legal 
obligations that Israel must abide by in its dealings with its Bedouin Arab 
population.104 First, Article 11(1) states: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of every-
one to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, includ-
ing adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous im-
provement of living conditions. The States Parties will take appropriate 
steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the 
essential importance of international co-operation based on free con-
sent.105 
Two issues arise out of this language, first, the right to adequate hous-
ing106 and, second, the idea of free consent in the realization of this right. 
As discussed above, the idea of free consent can hardly be reconciled 
with Israel’s post-1948 policy of Bedouin resettlement in townships 
within the enclosed military zone.107 In terms of adequate housing, be-
sides the fact that Bedouin settlements are clearly substandard in compar-
                                                                                                             
 99. See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text (discussing the various discrimina-
tory effects of Israeli policy toward its Bedouin minority). 
 100. In resettling the Negev Bedouin population in townships that lack adequate infra-
structure, irrigation, and basic services, the Bedouin population is in effect “deprived of 
its own means of subsistence,” and is deprived of its “right to liberty of movement and 
freedom to choose [its] residence,” as set forth in the ICCPR. ICCPR, supra note 88, arts. 
1(2), 12(1). 
 101. ICCPR, supra note 88, art. 2(2). 
 102. See generally HUSSEIN & MCKAY, supra note 20. 
 103. See generally MADRELL, supra note 4. 
 104. See Rangwala, supra note 5, at 454 (“As a party to the ICESCR, Israel is bound 
by its terms, and obligations under it should be reflected in Israel’s domestic policy.”). 
 105. ICESCR, supra note 89, art. 11(1). 
 106. For a general discussion of the adequacy of housing for the Negev Bedouin, see 
Rangwala, supra note 5. 
 107. See supra notes 33–35. 
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ison to Jewish settlements of similar size and location,108 there is also a 
more disturbing undercurrent at play since the lack of adequate housing 
can substantially diminish the realization of other fundamental rights (in-
cluding those set forth in the ICCPR).109 Israel has also not fulfilled its 
obligations under Article 12 of the ICESCR110 to reconcile discrepancies 
in providing proper health care to Negev Bedouin communities.111 Given 
that Israel is a signatory to these treaties, it is abundantly clear that it has 
an international legal responsibility, not just a moral or ethical impera-
tive, to actively remedy its treatment of the Negev Bedouin. 
Customary international law also imposes international legal obliga-
tions upon Israel regarding its conduct toward Bedouin Arabs. The 
strongest such evidence is found in the U.N. Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights (“Universal Declaration”).112 The Universal Declaration is 
commonly considered a reliable expression of customary international 
law113 and has been deemed so by Israeli courts.114 Article 7 secures the 
right to equal protection under the law, 115 and Article 8 grants the right 
to an “effective remedy” for the violations of the fundamental rights that 
the Universal Declaration guarantees.116 Israel’s history in relation to its 
                                                                                                             
 108. See generally MADRELL, supra note 4 
 109. See Rangwala, supra note 5, at 454 (“For example, it may be impossible to main-
tain the right to security of person, public assembly, or education where the right to ade-
quate housing is compromised.”). 
 110. ICESCR, supra note 89, art. 12 (“The State Parties to the present Covenant rec-
ognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physi-
cal and mental health. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant 
to achieve the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for: (a) The pro-
vision for the reduction of the stillbirth-rate and of infant mortality and for the healthy 
development of the child.”). 
 111. See MADRELL, supra note 4, at 17 (“Beduin children in the Negev have a higher 
rate of hospitalization than their Jewish counterparts. A third of Negev Beduin children 
are hospitalized at least once in their first year . . . [and many] infants also suffer malnu-
trition and consequently stunted growth.”). 
 112. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 27(2), U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declara-
tion]. 
 113. HUSSEIN & MCKAY, supra note 20, at 34. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Universal Declaration, supra note 112, art. 7 (“All are equal before the law and 
are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to 
equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and against 
any incitement to such discrimination.”). 
 116. Id. art. 8 (“Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent nation-
al tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by 
law.”). 
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treatment of Bedouin Arabs117 at best disregards and at worst defies the 
substantive guarantees of Articles 7 and 8 of the Universal Declaration. 
Furthermore, Article 17(2) states that “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily de-
prived of his property.”118 Israel’s policies of land expropriation119 after 
the establishment of the State in 1948, as well as its continued demolition 
of Bedouin houses,120 can certainly be viewed as arbitrary deprivation of 
property in stark violation of the Universal Declaration. Article 22121 “ar-
ticulates an overarching emphasis on the right to human development, 
and integrates all branches of human rights (civil, political economic, 
social, cultural) within the rubric of greater human development.”122 Ac-
cordingly, Israel must consider how its treatment of the Bedouin Arab 
minority fits within this framework, and must not only redress specific 
incidents of human rights abuses, but also align its legislative, judicial, 
and executive policies with the goal of “greater human development.”123 
In addition, Israel’s legal obligations under customary international law 
can be inferred from the text of the Wye River Memorandum (“Memo-
randum”),124 which delineates responsibilities for Israel and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization in their ongoing peace talks. Although the Me-
morandum is just a small link in the seemingly unending chain of back-
and-forth “peace agreements,”125 one of its provisions is especially rele-
vant to the rights of Bedouin Arabs. As a requisite condition for Israel’s 
agreeing to transfer nature reserve land to the Palestinians in Gaza, the 
Palestinian side agreed not to change “the status of these areas, without 
prejudice to the rights of the existing inhabitants in these areas, including 
Bedouins.”126 It is ironically telling that in its negotiations with an entity 
that has been its enemy for decades, Israel made a point of including the 
protection of Bedouin rights. Although anecdotal, it can be inferred from 
                                                                                                             
 117. See supra Part II.B. 
 118. Universal Declaration, supra note 112, art. 17. 
 119. See supra notes 19–20 and accompanying text. 
 120. See, e.g., infra note 140. 
 121. Supra note 112, art. 22 (“Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social 
security and is entitled to realization, through national effort and international co-
operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the 
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free develop-
ment of his personality.”). 
 122. Rangwala, supra note 5, at 452–53. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Wye River Memorandum, Oct. 23, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1251. 
 125. For evidence of the constant cycle of peace talks, one need only look at any daily 
newspaper on any given day, and the odds are strong that there will be some talk of the 
never-ending struggle for “peace in the Middle East.” 
 126. See supra note 124. 
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this Memorandum that Israel sees the rights of Bedouin Arabs as worthy 
of protection, notwithstanding its own failure to do so over the last sixty 
years.127 If Israel expects its enemies to treat Bedouin Arabs responsibly, 
it should follow both logically and ethically that it bears the same re-
sponsibility to its own Bedouin citizens. 
IV. STRANGERS IN A STRANGE LAND: RESPONSIBILITIES TO “OTHERS” 
IN JEWISH LAW 128 
Beyond the classical examples of international law discussed above, 
Israel’s legal obligations can also be inferred from what perhaps can be 
described as one of the first systems of “international law”—Jewish 
law.129 If, in fact, Israel is to be considered a Jewish State130 as opposed 
to a completely egalitarian democracy, its conduct should, at the very 
least, be in line with the tenets and teachings of Jewish law. 
The legal status of the “other” in Israel is founded in the Bible “upon 
the special protection and love of the God of Israel for the stranger.”131 
This special status is embodied by the divine command to “befriend the 
stranger, for you too were strangers in the land of Egypt.”132 Beyond 
general pronouncements, the Torah133 further lays down specific rules 
regarding the treatment of strangers by the people of Israel, illustrating 
“the degree to which Judaism has been willing to include the non-Jew 
within the framework of a Jewish society governed by universally appli-
cable rules of ethical conduct.”134 Understandably, not all of Jewish law 
was applied to those who were not followers of the religion, but still “the 
Torah nevertheless took care to grant them special protection and to 
                                                                                                             
 127. See supra note 117. 
 128. Special thanks to Rabbi Aaron Brusso for his help in researching and conceptua-
lizing the arguments for this section of the Note. 
 129. See Joseph Levi, Stranger, in CONTEMPORARY JEWISH RELIGIOUS THOUGHT: 
ORIGINAL ESSAYS ON CRITICAL CONCEPTS, MOVEMENTS, AND BELIEFS 917, 919 (Arthur A. 
Cohen & Paul Mendes-Flohr eds., 1987) (discussing Judaism’s conception of its own 
laws as having a “universal mission”). Furthermore, it can be argued that Jewish law is 
international in scope, since it has been followed by its adherents over thousands of years 
wherever in the world they may happen to reside. 
 130. Recently, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated unequivocally that the pre-
condition for any and all peace negotiations with the Palestinians is their recognition of 
Israel as first and foremost a “Jewish State.” See Barak Ravid, Erekat: Palestinians Will 
Not Accept Israel as ‘Jewish State,’ HAARETZ, Nov. 12, 2007, available at http://www.haaretz. 
com/hasen/spages/923076.html. 
 131. Levi, supra note 129, at 918. 
 132. Deuteronomy 10:19. 
 133. This is the Hebrew word for the Jewish bible. 
 134. Levi, supra note 129, at 918. 
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equalize their legal status with that of the Jewish majority.”135 Specifical-
ly, the Torah seeks to ensure that the stranger is not oppressed136 and 
prohibits the perversion of justice where the rights of the stranger are 
concerned.137 This protection of the stranger’s rights in Jewish law is also 
evidenced by modern thinkers who discern “a similar message of civil 
egalitarianism in the attitude of the laws of the Torah regarding the 
[stranger].”138 
While one could certainly argue that the rules of religious law have no 
relevance to the conduct of modern Israel towards its Bedouin minority, 
what is clear from the development of Jewish law throughout the ages is 
that it is “no longer theological principles that are central, but rather so-
cial and legal principles, such as equality before the law, which are 
drawn from humanistic philosophy and whose precursors are now seen in 
the ancient laws of the Bible.”139 Accordingly, Israel has a clear legal and 
ethical obligation, rooted in the traditions of the Bible and developed by 
subsequent social, philosophical, and legal thought, to treat the “stran-
gers” in its land with the same decency and respect it presently reserves 
exclusively for its Jewish citizens. Moreover, this makes the existential 
question of Israel’s continued viability—is it a Jewish State or a true de-
mocracy?—inapposite in the context of Bedouin rights, for no matter 
which principles govern (i.e., religious or democratic) the outcome 
should be the same. 
V. ALMOST HOME: THE PRESENT AND FUTURE OF BEDOUIN RIGHTS IN 
MODERN ISRAEL 
Unfortunately, the maltreatment of Bedouin Arabs in Israel continues 
to this day.140 The Israeli government continues its policy of forced evac-
uations and home demolitions in Bedouin villages in order to pave the 
way for more Jewish settlements in the Negev region.141 Perhaps even 
more disturbing is the fact that the domestic legal remedies for Israel’s 
violation of Bedouin rights seem, at best, hard to come by and, at worst, 
                                                                                                             
 135. Id. (citing Leviticus 19:33–34). 
 136. Exodus 22:21. 
 137. Deuteronomy 24:17. 
 138. Levi, supra note 129, at 923 (discussing the opinions of heralded philosophical 
minds like Martin Buber and Leo Baeck). 
 139. Id. at 924. 
 140. See International Human Rights Day, Dec. 10, 2007, http://adalah.org/eng/hrw.php. 
 141. Id. (“In order to establish . . . three new Jewish communities, the state is using 
multiple means and procedures to evacuate the entire Arab Bedouin population of Atir-
Umm al-Hieran, including filing lawsuits to evict them and requests for demolition orders 
against their homes to the courts.”). 
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unenforceable.142 Even if the Bedouins could appeal to the highest inter-
national legal bodies and raise causes of actions relating to Israel’s obli-
gations under the various treaties and conventions to which it is a signa-
tory,143 it is unclear what effect, if any, such appeals would have on 
Israeli conduct.144 Although organizations like Adalah145 exist for the 
purpose of protecting and defending the rights of Arab minorities in 
Israel,146 the fight for equality will clearly continue to be one fraught 
with ineffectiveness and frustration.147 
But there is hope, albeit somewhat dim. As discussed above,148 the 
Constitution, Law and Justice Committee of the Knesset is continuing to 
negotiate a draft of Israel’s written constitution and has said that it in-
tends to “reiterate the state’s commitment to equal rights for all, includ-
ing minorities.”149 Contrary to this claim, however, the head of the Con-
stitution, Law and Justice Committee, Menahem Ben-Sasson, recently 
admitted that the constitution now taking shape in the committee is likely 
to weaken, not strengthen, the rights of Israeli minority groups, including 
the Bedouins.150 If this were the case, it would fly in the face of what is 
arguably the “primary role of a constitution in a democratic state—
protecting minority rights by anchoring them in the constitution”151 so 
that the executive, legislative, and administrative branches of govern-
ment cannot infringe upon these rights. Furthermore, the president of the 
Israeli Bar Association recently remarked that the requisite function of a 
                                                                                                             
 142. See id. (“Despite court orders to freeze the home demolitions requested by Ada-
lah, the Israel Lands Administration demolished some houses in June 2007 leaving many 
families homeless.”). 
 143. See supra notes 88–89. 
 144. There are many examples of U.N. Resolutions that have tried to change the state 
of affairs in the region, with little or no success (too many to list here). Also, if Israeli 
court orders are not followed by the administrative bodies performing the evacuations 
and the demolitions, it would be highly unlikely that an outside tribunal’s decision would 
carry much weight either. 
 145. Adalah, The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel, www.adalah.org 
(last visited Sept. 29, 2008). 
 146. See supra note 140 (“Adalah is . . . representing village residents in lawsuits chal-
lenging all these [demolition and evacuation] orders, and is demanding an investigation 
and disciplinary proceedings against those responsible for the illegal demolitions.”). 
 147. Id. (discussing continued evacuations, segregation, and other quasi-legal mechan-
isms that only further entrench Bedouin inequality). 
 148. See Knesset Committee Debates on the Constitution for Israel, supra note 68. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Yuval Yoaz, Head of Knesset Panel Admits Draft Constitution Liable to Weaken 
Rights of Gays and Other Minorities, HAARETZ, Oct. 22, 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/ 
hasen/spages/915321.html. 
 151. Id. 
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constitution is “to protect weak sectors of the population” and that the 
price of a constitution “cannot be paid at the expense of minority groups 
within the population.”152 
As is so often the case in the region, as soon as one has reason to hope 
for progress (i.e., a constitution granting unalienable minority rights) 
something happens to dampen that hope (i.e., the head of the committee 
admitting minority rights are not the paramount consideration in the 
drafting process and may not even factor in at all in the final document). 
In order to begin to find a solution to the inherent inequality of Bedouin 
Arabs in Israel, the first step is for Israel to cease requiring recognition of 
Israel as a Jewish State as a precondition for peace talks.153 This prere-
quisite, which may seem elementary to its proponents, speaks to the heart 
of the problem faced by the Bedouins in modern Israel: they are second-
class citizens in a democratic state that should grant them full and equal 
rights, but chooses not to. The second step is to finish the drafting of a 
truly democratic and egalitarian constitution that guarantees, explicitly 
and unequivocally, the unalienable right to equality of all Israel’s inhabi-
tants. The final step is to recognize the shortcomings of the past and re-
commit to making positive and proactive institutional changes so that 
Israel will be a home for all its citizens, regardless of classifications such 
as Jew, Palestinian, or Bedouin. 
CONCLUSION 
Israel has numerous obligations under international law to treat all of 
its citizens with the same amount of decency and respect that it affords to 
its Jewish citizens. Moreover, the treaties and conventions to which it has 
committed place an affirmative duty upon the government of Israel to 
remedy its historical maltreatment of its Bedouin minorities and safe-
guard their rights in the years to come. Moreover, even Jewish law re-
quires better treatment of Bedouin minorities than what they experience 
at present. If Israeli leaders, as they are constantly claiming in the media, 
are truly interested in forging a lasting peace in the region, it is incum-
bent upon them to clean up their own house, before extending the olive 
branch to their neighbors. The political, intellectual, and academic elite 
in Israel must actively make their voices heard and declare that “not all 
who wandered should be lost,”154 in calling for Israel to fulfill its interna-
tional legal obligations in granting full economic, social, and political 
                                                                                                             
 152. Id. 
 153. See Ravid, supra note 130. 
 154. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
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rights to all Israeli citizens—then, and only then, will Bedouin Israelis 
truly be nomads no more. 
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